| Report ID: | 06-06-2313-17 |
| Initial Submission Date: | 2006-06-02 |
| Title: | Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords |
| Summary: | We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a
web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must
be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This
captures both the Overture model where bidders are ranked in
order of the submitted bids, and the Google model where
bidders are ranked in order of the expected revenue (or utility)
that their advertisement generates. Assuming separable click-through
rates, we prove revenue-equivalence between our auction and the
non-truthful next-price auctions currently in use.
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| Authors: | Aggarwal, Gagan; Goel, Ashish; Motwani, Rajeev |
| Contact email: | ashishg@stanford.edu |
| | Number of views : 892 Number of downloads : 0 |
