| Report ID: | 07-09-21325-38 |
| Initial Submission Date: | 2007-09-02 |
| Title: | A Message-Passing Paradigm for Resource Allocation |
| Summary: | We propose a message-passing paradigm for resource allocation problems. This is a framework for decentralized management that generalizes price-based systems by allowing incentives to vary across activities and consumption levels. Message-based incentives are defined through a new equilibrium concept. We demonstrate that message-based incentives lead to system-optimal behavior for convex resource allocation problems, yet yield allocations superior to those from price-based incentives for non-convex resource allocation problems. We describe a distributed and asynchronous algorithm for computing equilibrium messages and allocations, and demonstrate this in the context of a network resource allocation problem. |
| Authors: | Moallemi, Ciamac; Van Roy, Benjamin |
| Contact email: | ciamac@stanford.edu |
| | Number of views : 698 Number of downloads : 238 |
