| Summary: | In this paper we explore the interaction between content distribution
and traffic engineering. Because a traffic engineer may be unaware of
the structure of content distribution systems or overlay networks, his
management of the network does not fully anticipate how traffic might
change as a result of his actions. Content distribution systems that
assign servers at the application level can respond very rapidly to
changes in the routing of the network. Consequently, the decisions of the traffic engineer may almost never be applied to the intended traffic.
We use a game-theoretic framework in which infinitesimal users of a network select the source of content, and the traffic engineer decides how the traffic will route through the network. We formulate a game and prove the existence of equilibria. Additionally, we present a setting in which equilibria are socially optimal, essentially unique, and stable. Conditions under which efficiency loss may be bounded are presented, and the results are extended to the cases of general overlay networks and multiple autonomous systems.
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