The Case for Condorcet Elections
How election reform can eliminate spoilers, promote third party efforts, and clarify the meaning of democracy.  
Home PurposeThe motivation of this site: the necessity and practicality of a new election system for a changing world. Election TheoryThe basic axioms of what we should desire in an election, and descriptions of several methods that attempt to address these. Why Condorcet?Argument for why Condorcet is the optimal system which we should strive to implement. PracticalityHow electronic methods make Condorcet practical, secure, and desirable. Links/ContactSite credits, contact information, and links to other resources. GlossaryGlossary of specific terms used throughout the site.
Better Democracy Voters Candidates What about the Paradox? Comparison to Alternatives Method Selection

Better Democracy

Put simply, CondorcetThe general term for any election method that uses ranked ballots and has, as it's first princple, the Condorcet Criterion: any candidate which beats every other candidate individually must win the election. Any Condorcet method must come along with an ambiguity resolution procedure for cases in which there is no winner by this first criterion. voting brings democracy closer to what it should be: citizens expressing their opinions and thereby exercising power over the government. This section of the website discusses the ways in which Condorcet election procedure, regardless of the ambiguity resolution employed, achieves what we desire from democracy in the best possible way. In particular, Condorcet resolves, in the best possible way, the IllocutionaryThis is term applied to the act of voting, meaning that it consists of two distinct and often conflicting actions: an act of power (attempting to cause your most preferred possible candidate to win), and an act of speech (saying that you approve of the candidate you select). divide between power and speech in voting, encourages the participation of third parties while eliminating the prospect of vote-splitting and spoiled elections, and meets head-on Condorcet's ParadoxThis paradox is that in some situations it is impossible to obey majority rule in an election. The situation in which paradox can arise is what is called a majority rule cycle. This is when, according to the result of the election, there is a cycle of candidates, each beating the next in a runoff. Imagine the simplest case: there are three candidates: A, B, and C. A majority rule cycle occurs when A defeats B, B defeats C, and C defeats A. This is a paradox because to install any one of these three candidates defies majority rule, since there exists another candidate which the majority prefers..

The problems of democracy stem, almost exclusively, from the problem of strategicA vote is called "strategic," "tactical," or "pragmatic" if it does not reflect the voter's true preference, but is rather an attempt by the voter to secure the best possible outcome, given the voter's prediction of how other voters will act. voting. Only Condorcet methods address this problem face to face.

The most fundamental problem of democratic elections is the dichotomy of power and speech. Consult What is a Vote? to understand this problem. There are two aspects to this problem: conflict for the voter in choosing who to vote for, and conflict for the candidate, in choosing whether or not to run, and on what platform to run. In both cases, the person must make a decision: either to do what is most pragmatic, or what truly expresses the person’s desires. These two drives differ between voters and candidates, and is thus discussed separately in the two sections to follow. In both cases the elimination of strategic voting solves the problem, and Condorcet methods are the closest possible methods to solving the problem.

© 2006 Nathan Pflueger.
This page was last updated 9 June 2006.