Comparison to Other Election Methods

Taking for granted that PluralityThis is the voting system currently used for most American elections. Each voter chooses only one candidate, and the winner is the candidate with the most votes. voting is not an ideal system, here we undertake to prove why the CondorcetThe general term for any election method that uses ranked ballots and has, as it's first princple, the Condorcet Criterion: any candidate which beats every other candidate individually must win the election. Any Condorcet method must come along with an ambiguity resolution procedure for cases in which there is no winner by this first criterion. system, regardless of which resolution procedure is used, is superior to the other systems proposed. In general, Condorcet methods are to be considered superior for two reasons.

• Encourages honestA vote is called "honest" if it reflects the true preference of the voter, even if it is apparent to the voter that voting differently will produce a more preferred result. Voting More Effectively. Condorcet, more so that any other method, increases the incentive to vote honestly, rather than strategically, for reasons explored earlier in this section.
• Deals most logically with honest votes. Assuming that honest votes have been cast, Condorcet is the most logical way to select a winner based on these votes.

Approval Voting

Of the alternate methods mentioned, Approval VotingThis system is the most basic extension of traditional plurality. Rather than selecting a single candidate, voters simply select one or more candidates of which they “approve,” in effect voting as many times as they want, but only once for each candidate. The winner is the candidate who receives the most votes, pure and simple. is the most preferable. However, it still has some notable drawbacks compared to Condorcet. It encourages honest votes to the extent that there is no reason not to vote for one’s first choice, which is not true in Plurality, but there is incentive to withdraw support from even rather preferred lower choices, out of fear that they will upset your first choice (monotonicityThis is technical term referring to the property that expressing your preference for a particular candidate should increase that candidates chance of winning. It is fairly obvious why this should be the case. is not satisfied). Thus the incentive is not towards 100% honest voting.

Furthermore, it is not clear what honest voting would entail. On the surface, this would mean “voting for all the candidates you would not mind electing,” but this is murky at best, since one might have to do a lot of compromising to make a statement like this (any many might object on principle to “approving” of any candidates at all). Finally, even if voting were 100% honest, approval would not deal with this data well, simply for the reason that candidates supported by similar factions would be differentiated only by the preferences of those on the fringes, approving of one or the other, not by the preferences of the faction as a whole.

Instant Runoff

Instant RunoffThis election method is based on the principle of being able to initially vote for your preferred choice, and then transfer your vote to more viable candidates if your first choice cannot win. Like Condorcet methods, IRV begins with a ranked ballot. Initially, all first choices are tallied, and if one candidate wins a majority, they win. If no candidate has the majority, then the candidate with the least votes is eliminated from all ballots (wherever that candidate was the first choice, the second choice becomes the new first choice) and the process begins again. It is called "instant" in comparison to other election systems where a series of "runoffs" are held, reducing the pool of candidates each time. In instant runoff, the voters need not return to the polls, since these runoffs can be performed instantly using ranked ballots. has the benefit of being very logical if one assumes honest voting. However, it is first of all by no means perfect towards this end, and can often violate the Condorcet CriterionAny candidate that would defeat every other candidate in a one-on-one runoff must win the election. This is simply a restatement of majority rule.. More problematic for IRV, however, is the presence of very peculiar and effective kinds of strategic voting. For example, in many cases it would be possible for the supporters of one candidate to force that candidate's election not by supporting the candidate itself, but by forcing the elimination of a similar candidate, which might lock up more votes than are sacrificed in this process (monotonicityThis is technical term referring to the property that expressing your preference for a particular candidate should increase that candidates chance of winning. It is fairly obvious why this should be the case. fails). All strategic voting is of this form: very contrived but potentially very powerful and therefore problematic. Thus not only will voters be confounded as to the best strategic vote, but they will also be confounded about how their fellow voters will act, and finally the nation itself will be confounded about where the electorate’s true loyalties lie in the face of this confusion. IRV is an initially attractive but ultimately untrustworthy system.

Borda Count

The BordaThe Borda method is a means of giving different numbers of “points” to various candidates, so that one can choose one candidate as their distinct first choice but still lend support to others. Typically, a ranked ballot is used, with the voter’s first choice being given the greatest number of points, and each subsequent candidate receiving one fewer. The winner is the candidate with the most points. count system is something of a compromise: it accepts strategic voting as the electoral paradigm and makes it as lucid as possible. The same problems that strategic voting creates for plurality, such as vote-splitting and spoiler candidates, are present in Borda, but it allows honest voters some form of compromise: they can vote strategically but still lend their support to true beliefs on the side (or vote their beliefs and offer some support for their strategic desire). Thus Borda is difficult to compare with Condorcet because it is very different in philosophy. We could debate the merits of evaluating an election based on honest Borda votes, but this is a moot point because it could not happen (moreover, it is NOT a good way to deal with honest votes – Condorcet is far superior due to the Condorcet criterion itself, and it actually encourages them). It it is the opinion of this website that any method that encourages honest voting is preferable on principle, so while Borda is apparently the most valiant effort of the strategic camp, we do not support it.