The Case for Condorcet Elections
How election reform can eliminate spoilers, promote third party efforts, and clarify the meaning of democracy.  
Home PurposeThe motivation of this site: the necessity and practicality of a new election system for a changing world. Election TheoryThe basic axioms of what we should desire in an election, and descriptions of several methods that attempt to address these. Why Condorcet?Argument for why Condorcet is the optimal system which we should strive to implement. PracticalityHow electronic methods make Condorcet practical, secure, and desirable. Links/ContactSite credits, contact information, and links to other resources. GlossaryGlossary of specific terms used throughout the site.
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Motivation

The Void

This site exists to fill an apparent void. The ideas of CondorcetThe general term for any election method that uses ranked ballots and has, as it's first princple, the Condorcet Criterion: any candidate which beats every other candidate individually must win the election. Any Condorcet method must come along with an ambiguity resolution procedure for cases in which there is no winner by this first criterion. voting have existed for hundreds of years, yet few have stepped forward to seriously advocate on its behalf. There exist many resources which seek to describe alternative voting methods from a purely analytical perspective, without making a serious argument for why they must become reality now. None consider how we might go about creating positive change, and what practical implications arise.

Pragmatism

This site is the product of pragmatism. Unlike other sites describing electoral methods in academic detail, we seek to be straightforward and realistic. No other resource exists to advocate both theory and implementation at once. The ivory tower knows that Condorcet voting is best. We wish to show that the best is not just a pipe dream, and we are realistic in our prescriptions.

Moreover, our analysis of the danger and possibility of strategicA vote is called "strategic," "tactical," or "pragmatic" if it does not reflect the voter's true preference, but is rather an attempt by the voter to secure the best possible outcome, given the voter's prediction of how other voters will act. voting is simply more realistic than any other resource. All other sources we have found consider any theoretical strategic voting that can occur, but make no effort to critically imagine when it really would occur, and what can be done to nearly eliminate it. All other resources simply state the theorem that it cannot be eliminated completely; we take this premise and ask the critical question: "what, then, should be do?"

Accessibility

Other resources on election methods are lengthy and fairly uninspiring. This is not to downplay the importance of rigor, but those skeptical of electoral reform don’t have the patience to wade through it. This site is the only one that aims to encapsulate why Condorcet is reasonable in principle, which everyone can understand. We aim to make a quick argument, straight to the point that this must be done, and it can be done now.

About this Site

This site was created by Nathan Pflueger as a part of a course in writing for the web at Stanford University. It grew out of previous research on the important role of third parties in American politics, and a strong conviction that any democracy has a responsibility to enable this role with as little stigma as possible. The site welcomes anyone who wishes to contribute; if you are interested, please go to the Contact section.

© 2006 Nathan Pflueger.
This page was last updated 9 June 2006.