The Case for Condorcet Elections
How election reform can eliminate spoilers, promote third party efforts, and clarify the meaning of democracy.  
Home PurposeThe motivation of this site: the necessity and practicality of a new election system for a changing world. Election TheoryThe basic axioms of what we should desire in an election, and descriptions of several methods that attempt to address these. Why Condorcet?Argument for why Condorcet is the optimal system which we should strive to implement. PracticalityHow electronic methods make Condorcet practical, secure, and desirable. Links/ContactSite credits, contact information, and links to other resources. GlossaryGlossary of specific terms used throughout the site.
What is a vote? Election Criteria The Paradox Condorcet Systems Other Systems Ambiguity Resolution Example

Other Methods

These are various other election styles that have been proposed, or are in use. Some of these can be used in conjunction with CondorcetThe general term for any election method that uses ranked ballots and has, as it's first princple, the Condorcet Criterion: any candidate which beats every other candidate individually must win the election. Any Condorcet method must come along with an ambiguity resolution procedure for cases in which there is no winner by this first criterion. as ambiguity resolution procedures. See Example to see a demonstration of each of these methods for a particular electoral result. Of these, we support Approval Voting as the best stepping stone to better electoral systems, but the other systems are not optimal.

Approval Voting

This system is the most basic extension of traditional plurality. Rather than selecting a single candidate, voters simply select one or more candidates of which they “approve,” in effect voting as many times as they want, but only once for each candidate. The winner is the candidate who receives the most votes, pure and simple. This is a very intelligent system, and until the nation is ready for Condorcet this system should be implemented immediately in place of the vastly inferior plurality system.

Advantages

  • Simplicity. This method is very easy to understand for the voter, and very easy to tally.
  • Elimination of Spoilers. Approval voting meets the anti-spoiler criterion. The introduction of another party does not change in any way how all the others are compared, so the only way in which the election changes is if the third party wins.

Disadvantages

Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)

This method has gained widespread popularity among some people, and there is at least one advocacy group on its behalf. It is based on the principle of being able to initially vote for your preferred choice, and then transfer your vote to more viable candidates if your first choice cannot win. Like Condorcet methods, IRV begins with a ranked ballotA ballot on which a vote consists in ranking the candidates in order of preference.. Initially, all first choices are tallied, and if one candidate wins a majority, they win. If no candidate has the majority, then the candidate with the least votes is eliminated from all ballots (wherever that candidate was the first choice, the second choice becomes the new first choice) and the process begins again. It is called "instant" in comparison to other election systems where a series of "runoffs" are held, reducing the pool of candidates each time. In instant runoff, the voters need not return to the polls, since these runoffs can be performed instantly using ranked ballots.

Advantages

  • Logical. This method is fairly easy to understand and very logical. Rather than making a judgment of whether their first choice can win, voters can essentially “try” their first choice, and defer to their second if necessary.
  • Reduction of Spoilers.The spoiler effect is reduced (but not eliminated) in IRV. In plurality voting, a vote for a candidate who does not win is essentially wasted, whereas IRV enables each voter to have a “backup.”

Disadvantages

  • Implementation. The means of tabulating and publishing results would be very difficult. It would not be possible to tabulate the electoral results in a single matrix, as in Condorcet, or give straightforward counts, as in plurality or approval, but rather each ballot must be kept separate and examined multiple times.
  • Accountability. Due to the computation necessary to tabulate results, it would extremely difficult for an individual citizen to examine and verify the election results for themselves.
  • Vote-Splitting. Vote-splitting (candidates for a single ideology being split among similar candidates) is still a problem in IRV, though not as much so as in plurality. In particular, IRV does not meet the Condorcet criterion.
  • Burying. This is the phenominon that sometimes supporters of a candidate can actually cause that candidate to win by ranking him/her lower. For an example, consult the Example section, under the Instant Runoff section. This means that IRV does not satisfy the monotonicityThis is technical term referring to the property that expressing your preference for a particular candidate should increase that candidates chance of winning. It is fairly obvious why this should be the case. criterion.

Borda Count

The Borda method is a means of giving different numbers of “points” to various candidates, so that one can choose one candidate as their distinct first choice but still lend support to others. Typically, a ranked ballot is used, with the voter’s first choice being given the greatest number of points, and each subsequent candidate receiving one fewer. The winner is the candidate with the most points.

Advantages

Disadvantages

© 2006 Nathan Pflueger.
This page was last updated 9 June 2006.